Joel Halpern
2018-12-03 18:46:55 UTC
Review result: Ready with Issues
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-httpbis-cdn-loop-01
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-12-03
IETF LC End Date: 2018-12-11
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC
There are two issues that I think should be addressed
before publication
Major issues: N/A
Minor issues:
This depends upon CDNs which have not been upgraded not stripping this
header. While I can believe that is a reasonable assumption, it seems that
a paragraph explaining that it is the case, and if possible what experience
leads us to think it is the case, would be helpful.
This document says that it is to protect against attackers causing loops.
If the attacker is an external customer, the advice in the security
considerations section makes sense. The other apparent attack would be an
attacker in the network who strips the information each time it comes past.
I believe the reason this is only an apparent attack is that such an
attacker could almost as easily simply generate additional messages instead
of producing a loop. If I have inferred this correctly, it seems useful to
state it.
Nits/editorial comments: N/A
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-httpbis-cdn-loop-01
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-12-03
IETF LC End Date: 2018-12-11
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
Summary: This document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC
There are two issues that I think should be addressed
before publication
Major issues: N/A
Minor issues:
This depends upon CDNs which have not been upgraded not stripping this
header. While I can believe that is a reasonable assumption, it seems that
a paragraph explaining that it is the case, and if possible what experience
leads us to think it is the case, would be helpful.
This document says that it is to protect against attackers causing loops.
If the attacker is an external customer, the advice in the security
considerations section makes sense. The other apparent attack would be an
attacker in the network who strips the information each time it comes past.
I believe the reason this is only an apparent attack is that such an
attacker could almost as easily simply generate additional messages instead
of producing a loop. If I have inferred this correctly, it seems useful to
state it.
Nits/editorial comments: N/A